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Introduction
In July of 2019, at the Summer Institute on AI and Society in Edmonton, Canada (co-
sponsored by CIFAR and the AI Pulse Project of UCLA Law),  scholars from across
disciplines came together in an intensive workshop. For the second half  of the
workshop, the cohort split  into smaller working groups to delve into specific topics
related to AI and Society.
I  proposed deeper exploration on the topic of “agency,”  which is  defined differently
across domains and cultures,  and relates to many of the topics of discussion in AI
ethics, including responsibility and accountability. It is also the subject of an ongoing
art and research project I’m producing.  As a group, we looked at definitions of
agency across fields,  found paradoxes and incongruities,  shared our own questions,
and produced a visual  map of the conceptual  space.  We decided that our disparate
perspectives were better articulated through a collection of short written pieces,
presented as a set,  rather than a singular essay on the topic.  The outputs of this
work are shared here.
This set of essays,  many of which are framed as provocations,  suggests that there
remain many open questions, and inconsistent assumptions on the topic. Many of the
writings include more questions than answers,  encouraging readers to revisit  their
own beliefs about agency.  As we further develop AI systems, and refer to humans
and non-humans as “agents”– we will benefit from a better understanding of what we
mean when we call  something an “agent” or claim that an action involves “agency.”
This work is  under development and many of us will  continue to explore this in our
ongoing AI work.
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– Sarah Newman, Project Lead, August 2019
1. Characterizing Agency
Jon Bowen
PhD student in Philosophy,  Western University
Some of the beings we encounter in our environment are inanimate.  These things
may be pushed and pulled, they may collapse or disintegrate. In each of these cases,
the entities are fundamentally passive–if  they move or change,  one suspects that
these movements and changes will  be exhaustively explained by appealing to
mechanical  forces within or without.
But there is  another kind of entity in our environment.  These beings seem to be
fundamentally goal-directed. To appearances,  they are spontaneous initiators of
their own actions.  These are animate beings,  or agents.  The movements of these
entities seem to be best explained not by appeal to mechanical  causes of their
activity,  but to the goals that they are striving towards,  the beliefs they have about
the world,  and their desires.
Giving a precise definition of what animacy or agency consists of is  no easy task for
the philosopher,  but nonetheless we appear to have no difficulty at all  recognizing
animate motion and distinguishing it  from the motion of inanimate objects.  Even
human infants,  it  seems, can detect animate motion and differentiate it  from
inanimate motion in point-light displays,  even when occlusions are present.
But why should this be the case? Why would it  be so difficult  to give a theory of
intentional  action,  and yet so easy to detect it? I  will  set out one suggestion.  We do
not, as has been proposed, infer intentions, beliefs, and desires as a part of a theory
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for explaining or predicting behavior.  Instead, intentional  action is  behavior with
certain distinctive, overt characteristics,  which our perceptual systems have evolved
to directly perceive.  Goal-directed behaviors,  I  will  suggest,  are a very real  kind of
behavior out there in the world with distinctive characteristics.  Furthermore,  it  is
important that animals perceive and understand this particular kind of behavior,  and
sure enough, they are able to do so with astonishing acuity.
What are we saying when we explain the activities of another person (or of a non-
human animal)  by appealing to their intentions? Here I  will  draw on an analysis from
Dennis Walsh: “A teleological explanation is one that explains the nature or activities
of an entity,  or the occurrence of an event,  by citing the goal  it  subserves.  A system
has goal,  E,  just in case it  exhibits goal-directed behavior toward E.  Goal-directed
behavior is  a gross property of a system as a whole.”  (p.  177)
What this amounts to is not an account of the intrinsic causal etiology of the agent’s
behavior.  Instead, we are locating that behavior in a chain of events that show a
certain distinctive pattern. If an agent is trying to do X, then its behavior will flexibly
reconfigure itself in the service of that goal.  When a dropped object encounters the
ground, it  will  stop.  When an agent’s initial  attempts to pursue some goal are
thwarted, that agent will spontaneously and flexibly reconfigure its behavior so as to
continue to pursue its goal. A human need not stop at the ground–they can retrieve a
shovel,  and perhaps a jackhammer or a drill  if  called for (if  they really want to!)  This
is to say,  when an agent is  engaging in goal-directed activity,  its  behavior is  robust
against perturbations and obstacles in a way characteristically not present in
inanimate objects.
If  there are such systems in nature–systems that will  reliably produce effects by
marshaling their intrinsic causal  capacities in the service of goals–then clearly the
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perceiving animal would be at an advantage if they could detect them when present!
The challenge,  from the perspective of an animal’s  perceptual  system, then,  is  to
detect or pick up the information which specifies what the goals of other agents in
their acting are.  While this might sound like quite a feat,  again,  this is  something we
all  seem to be very good at.
If  agency amounts to the capacity for intentional  action,  and the preceding account
of goal-directed behavior is  sound, what basis might there be to deny that such a
thing exists as a real  phenomenon in nature,  and a real  attribute of natural  beings?
2. The Value of the Concept of Agency in an
Increasingly Rational World
Osonde Osoba
Information scientist,  RAND Corporation
Professor,  Pardee RAND Graduate School
Let us concede that different traditions of thought have different definitions and
perspectives on what it  means to be an agent or to have agency.  There are some
common threads that may be useful  to highlight.  I  will  focus on one.  Most
conceptions of Agency are rooted in action,  in doing,  in affecting a substrate
environment.
A working definition for the purposes of this discussion could go thus:
An agent is  an entity that is  capable of causing or effecting change in its world in
pursuit  of private (personal)  goals.
This definition has a couple of features worth highlighting:
AI & Agency
by: Sarah Newman, Abeba Birhane, Mike Zajko, Osonde A. Osoba, Carina Prunkl, Gabriel Lima, Jon Bowen, Rich
Sutton and Cathy Adams
| 5
The primacy of causality:  We focus on the idea of causal  influence as a defining
characteristic.  An entity whose whole existence consists of internal ruminations (e.g.
Ibn Tufayl’s  floating man) does not meet our criteria.  However much sophisticated
intelligence it  applies to its sense perceptions,  it  has no influence over its
environment.  It  can achieve no goals in its world no matter how intensely it  wills
them.
Contextual  worlds:  Context determines the relevant world over which the agent
aims to exert influence. Entities can be part of numerous worlds or environments. An
entity’s agency in each of these worlds is  determined by how much causal  influence
it can exert in each one. We can imagine a measure of power based on what fraction
of an agent’s environment it  can influence.
Private goals:  Private goals may be related to Aristotle’s idea of a “final  cause,”  the
reason for which a thing exists.  The capacity for pure action without goals requires
no planning,  interiority,  or intentionality.  We will  argue that tracking that sort of
capacity is  not useful.
The concept of agency has proven useful for rooting responsibility and/or liability in
entities capable of modifying their actions in response to external  influence.  Such a
capacity for redress or accountability can arguably only be supported by entities
capable of goal-oriented behavior.1  Responsibility can be moral  or legal  (more
coercive/backed by institutional  power).  Agency likely serves other important
functions.  But the responsibility-rooting function of agency is  crucial  for influencing
or controlling behavior in social  structures.
This view of agency is  explicitly not about independence or autonomy. Agency,  in
this conception,  is  closer to a useful  fiction that enables the clean assignment of
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responsibility and dessert.  And the default  assumption is  that agents exist within
networks of influence. A degree of external manipulation of agents is the norm, not a
novel pattern.
Historically,  the use of agency for allocating moral  responsibility has been a useful
but imperfect device:  the assignment of moral  responsibility has not always tracked
causal  responsibility.  The long tradition of arguments for the justice of gods
(theodicies) is a case in point. If evil befalls a person, it must be because that person
has misused his agency (“sinned”) and therefore deserves or is  morally responsible
for his lot.2  Some superstitions may also be construed to serve a similar function.
These failures in causal  attribution happen because the world is  complex,  causal
attribution is  notoriously difficult,  & causal  influences can be very subtle when they
exist.  By contrast,  gods are simpler,  more convenient causal  explanations.
Our modern conception of moral  responsibility is  becoming more rational,  more
scientific.  Part of the goal  of rational  thought is  to focus on the true causes of
observed phenomena. Weber goes so far as to argue that scientific inquiry is  just a
rational  incarnation of theodicy.3  We have moved from agency based on imperfect
beliefs towards a more causal  conception of responsibility.
But what happens when our rational  understanding of reality expands to the point
where we are able to track causal  influences as finely as possible?4 E.g.  recent
literature has begun to undermine agency-based explanations of individual  behavior
in favor of longer chains of causal  influence that reach past the mask of more
person-focused conceptions of agency. How do we ground responsibility and liability
when large swathes of action can be explained away via causal  factors outside the
individual  (e.g.  the larger explaining value of social  influence or manipulation,
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genetics,  environmental  factors,  etc.)?
Does the concept of agency survive this trend?
3. Human agency in the age of AI
Abeba Birhane
PhD Candidate,  School of Computer Science,  University College Dublin
Provocation:
The question of agency necessarily provokes the question of what it  means to be a
person and, in particular,  what it  means to be a person in the age of ubiquitous
artificial intelligence (AI) systems. We are embodied beings that inherently exist in a
web of relations within political,  historical,  cultural,  and social  norms.  Increasingly,
seemingly invisible AI systems permeate most spheres of life,  mediating and
structuring our communications,  interactions,  relations,  and ways of being.  Since we
do not exist in a social,  political,  historical,  and AI-mediated vacuum, it  is  imperative
to ground agency as inherently inseparable from the person as construed in such
contingent constituent factors.  Depending on the context and the space we occupy
in the social  world,  all  these dynamic and contingent factors serve as enabling
constraints for our capacity to act.  Our capacity to act within these contextual
factors varies in degree depending on the space we occupy at a certain time, in a
certain socioeconomic context;  the more privileged we are,  the fewer the potential
constraints,  and the greater our degrees of agency.
Essay:
The individual  is  never a fully autonomous entity:  rather,  they come into being and
maintain that sense of existence through dynamic,  intersubjective,  and reciprocal
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relations with others.5  Our biology,  current social  and cultural  norms,  historical,  and
contextual  contingencies,  as well  as our physical  and technological  environment,
constitute who we are and our degrees of agency within a given time and context.
Increasingly, AI systems are becoming an integral part of our environment – be it the
search engines that we interact with,  our social  media activities,  the facial
recognition systems that we come in contact with,  or the algorithmic systems that
sift  through our job applications – further adding enabling,  or limiting,  constraints.
(Enabling constraints here might include having a common Western male name, or
other demographic traits,  that the job application algorithm chooses to include,
rather than exclude. These are still constraints, but in certain instances they increase
opportunity,  rather than decrease them.)
We are embodied beings that necessarily exist in a web of relations with others,
within certain social  and cultural  norms as well  as through emerging technologies.
This means our sense of being,  as well  as our capacity to act,  are inextricably
intertwined and continually changing as we move between various spheres taking on
various roles.  The various factors that constitute (and sustain) who we are influence
the varying degrees of agency we are afforded. As we go on about our daily lives, we
move between various social  and cultural  conventions,  physical  environmental
enablers (or disablers)  of certain behaviors and actions (as opposed to others),  and
technological  tools that shape, reinforce,  and nudge behavior and actions in certain
directions (and not others). As a PhD student, my role, responsibility, and capacity to
act in my academic environment,  for example,  is  different than that of my role,
responsibility,  and capacity for action when I  am at a social  gathering within the
immigrant community.  Furthermore,  my interaction with others through Twitter is
different from both these other contexts, and is partially determined by the ways the
medium affords possible actions and interactions. Our sense of agency, then, is fluid,
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dynamic,  and continually negotiated within these various physical,  mental,
psychological,  technological,  and cultural  spaces.  Discussion of agency,
consequently,  cannot emerge in a social,  technological,  and contextual  vacuum. Nor
is it  something we can view as stable or pin on individual  persons due to the
complex,  contingent,  and changing factors that constitute and sustain personhood.
Conversely,  agency cannot be an abstract term that we attempt to define and
analyze in a general,  one-size-fits-all  manner but one that needs to be grounded in
people.  People,  due to their embeddedness in context,  culture,  history,  and socio-
economic status,  are afforded varying degrees of enabling constraints.  Agency,
therefore,  is  not an all-or-nothing phenomenon but something that varies in degrees
depending on individual  factors,  circumstances and situations.  Individuals at the top
of the socio-economic hierarchy,  for example,  face relatively fewer disabling
constraints,  consequently resulting in a higher degree of agency,  and the reverse
holds for those at the lower end of society.  For example,  depending on their socio-
economic and educational  background, one may be labelled “eccentric” vs.  “insane”,
a “lone wolf” vs.  a “radicalized extremist”,  a “freedom fighter” vs.  a “terrorist”.
Agency,  AI,  and ethical  considerations
Living in a world of ubiquitous networked communication,  a world where AI
technologies are interwoven into the social,  political,  and economic sphere means
living in a world where who we are,  and subsequently our degree of agency,  is
partially influenced by automated AI systems.
The concept of AI often provokes the idea of (future and imaginary) sentient
artificial  beings,  or autonomous vehicles such as self-driving cars or robots.  These
preconceptions often assume (implicitly or otherwise) that AI systems are entities
that exist independently of humans in a machine vs.  human dichotomy. This view,
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which dominates academic and public discourse surrounding AI is  a deeply
misconceived, narrow, and one-dimensional conception of AI.  What AI refers to in
the present context is  rather grounded in current systems and tools that operate in
most spheres of life.  These are seemingly invisible tools and systems that mediate
communication,  interaction with others and other technological  infrastructures that
alter the social  fabric.  These AI systems make life effortless,  as they disappear into
the background to the extent that we forget their very existence. They have become
so inextricably integrated with our daily lives that life without them seems
unimaginable.  As Weiser6  has argued, these are the most profound and powerful
technologies.  “The most profound technologies are those that disappear.  They
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until  they are indistinguishable
from it.”
These systems sort,  classify,  analyze,  and predict our behaviors and actions.  Our
computers,  credit  card transactions,  phones,  and the cameras and sensors that
proliferate public and private spaces are recording and codifying our “habits”,
“behaviors”,  and “experiences”.  Such ubiquitous interlinked technological  milieu
continually maps out the where,  when, what,  and how of our behaviors and actions,
which provide superficial  patterns that infer who we are.7  Whether we are engaging
in political debate on Facebook, connecting to “free” wi-fi, using Google Maps to get
from point A to B,  searching for sensitive health information on Google,  ordering
grocery shopping,  posting selfies on Instagram, or out in the park for a jog;  our
actions and behaviors produce a mass flow of data that produce pattern-based
actionable indices about “who we are”. These superficial extrapolations, in turn, feed
models that predict how we might behave in various scenarios, whether we might be
a “suitable” candidate for a job,  or are likely to commit crimes,  or are risks that
should be denied loans or mortgages.  Questions of morality (often misconceived as
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technical  questions in need of a technical  fix)  are increasingly handed over to
engineers and commercial  industries developing and deploying AI systems as they
are bestowed with sorting,  pattern detecting,  and predicting behaviors and actions.
These predictive systems give options and opportunities to act or they limit what we
see and the possible actions we can take. And as O’Neil8  reminds us, each individual
person does not pass through these processes to the same degree nor do they suffer
the consequences equally.  “The privileged are processed by people,  the masses by
machines.”
These systems not only predict behavior based on observed similar patterns,  they
also alter the social  fabric and reconfigure the nature of reality in the process.
Through “personalized” ads and recommender systems, for example,  the level and
amount of options put in front of us varies depending on the AI’s decision of “who
we are,”  which reflects the place we occupy in the social  hierarchy.  The constraints
that provide us with little or great room to act in the world are closely related to our
socio-economic status and, increasingly, to who our data says we are. Unsurprisingly,
the more privileged we are,  the more we are afforded the capacity to overrule
algorithmic identification and personalization (or not be subjected to them at all),
maximizing our degrees of agency.
Since agency is  inextricably linked to subjecthood, which is  necessarily political,
moral,  social,  and increasingly digital,  the impact of power structures is  inescapable.
These power relations and the capacity to minimize the potential  constraints AI
imposes on agency,  is  starkly clear when we look at the lifestyle choices that
powerful  agents in Silicon Valley,  who make and deploy technology,  are afforded.
For example,  while screen-aided education is  pushed towards mainstream schools,
the rich on the other hand are reluctant to adopt such practices.9  Agency,  the
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capacity to act in a given technological  environment and context varies in degree
from person to person.  Silicon Valley tech developers,  those with power and
awareness of technology as constraining powers, are reluctant to let it infiltrate their
children’s surroundings.  Some go so far as banning their nannies from the use of
screens.10
Agency is  not an all-or-nothing phenomenon that we either do or do not have.
Rather,  agency is  inextricably linked to our social,  political,  and historical  contexts,
which are increasingly influenced by technological forces. These forces grant people
varying degrees of agency.  In an increasingly AI-powered society our capacity to act
is limited or expanded based on our privilege;  agency is  increasingly becoming a
commodity that only the privileged can afford.
4. Agency to Change the World
Mike Zajko
Assistant Professor,  Department of History and Sociology,  University of British
Columbia
Abstract
Social  theory has identified agency with social  change and dynamism, bringing
tension and possibility to a world where social  structures are reproduced. The
concept of agency can rescue us from the notion that we are simply the product of
our conditioning (zombies of embodied habits),  and stands in opposition to
ontologies that foreground practices at the expense of subjects.  While a humanist
conception links agency to purposive action, an expansive (post-humanist)  definition
elides the question of intentionality,  and links agency with action,  irrespective of
purpose.  According to this view, rather than being an exclusive human property,
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agency is all around us, and society has always consisted of relations between human
and non-human actors.  We should keep in mind that agency is  not absolute or
independent,  but contextual  and relational.  If  we conceive of agency in this way,  we
can see the stakes of some of the current debates about AI:  to what extent will
these systems act as agents of change in our world,  and how will  AI affect (enhance,
extend, supplant,  or constrain) human agency?
Agency to Change the World
How did Western intellectuals go from believing agency to be the exclusive property
of the human subject,  to considering whether algorithmic agents,  or AI systems, also
have agency? One understanding is  that as AI increasingly approximates human
intelligence,  it  attains attributes formerly reserved for humanity.  But an argument
can be made that AI today,  even in its narrowest forms,  already exercises agency,
and that humans were never particularly special  to begin with.
It  is  commonly said that people exercise agency to achieve their desires,  goals,  and
interests. In sociology, agency has long been seen as the source of change in society.
Agency is  why society does not remain in a steady state,  despite all  the ways that
social  structures are reproduced. Without agency,  we would all  be pawns shaped
and manipulated by larger forces that often precede our existence: children molded
into reproductions of their parents;  compliant,  orderly workers reproduced by the
educational  system to passively accept ideologies that justify why the existing order
is natural,  desirable,  or worthy of being preserved. Agency refers to our ability to
change this social  structure,  to disagree with our parents,  use education to advance
knowledge, achieve social  mobility,  critique ideology,  and challenge government.
There is  a longstanding debate in social  theory about the relationship between
agency and social  structure,11  which has largely gone stale and unresolved. But
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agency continues to provide the tension that prevents a totalizing view of structure.
Not everyone agrees that agency is  required to understand humanity or the
relationship between individuals and society,  but social  theories that do without
agency,  or that provide an impoverished view of agency,  paint a deterministic
picture.  Individuals are conceived not as subjects,  but through their habits and
practices,  or as the effects of the social  structures that produce them. Without
agency,  we are zombies,  automata,  or cultural  dupes.12
Amidst some of the debates about agency and structure in the 1980s and 1990s,  a
new conception (often associated with Bruno Latour and Actor-Network Theory)13
began to take hold.  The provocative argument was that agency was not confined to
humans,  but that society was composed of both human and non-human “actants.”14
Agency was defined roughly with action,  and the ability to affect the world.  If  a
human worker was replaced by an object (even an inanimate one)15  that could play
the same role,  then that object similarly exercised agency.  Because in many of our
interactions with the world,  whether in laboratory experiments or farming,16  humans
cannot fully predict or control the outcome, nature also has agency – co-creating the
world with us.  Questions of intentionality and purposiveness are elided through this
focus on action.
Whether in its humanist or post-humanist form, Western theory’s interest in agency
has also been subjected to significant critique.  The idea of an autonomous human
subject is  arguably a historical  invention – a distinctly Western,  masculine,
individualistic vision of man. Feminist theorists advanced these arguments decades
ago, pointing to the often unacknowledged work (disproportionately performed by
women) of nurturing and caring for ‘autonomous’  subjects.  Complicating but not
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necessarily rejecting the ideal  of autonomy, these authors advanced a concept of
agency that situates it  firmly within social  relationships.17  Relational  and non-human
conceptions of agency are common in Indigenous and non-Western ontologies,18
rooted in the understanding that the world is  agentially alive,  and that humanity is
inexorably linked to and dependent on these forces.  In an article section titled
Columbus Discovers Non-Human Agency,19  three authors influenced by Indigenous
feminist literature point to the Eurocentric and settler colonial  bias of a recent turn
in social  theory.  In this ‘new materialism’,  authors influenced by Latour and feminist
STS have made expansive claims about agency that may be innovative for social
theory,  but which are quite traditional  for unacknowledged indigenous ontologies.
At this point it  is  worth reflecting on these divergent conceptions of agency.  Along
one dimension outlined above, they run the range from treating agency as a
distinctly human property, linked to subjectivity, consciousness and intentionality, to
a broader view of agency as whatever has effects on the world (and ourselves). At its
broadest, we are not agents at all:  distinctions of subjects and objects are dissolved,
and the entire universe becomes a quantum soup of intra-active becoming.20  But
somewhere between this posthuman extreme and the reassurance of conventional
humanism, we can return to a view of agency that encompasses both humans and AI,
as agents that change the world,  and are entwined in relations with one another.
Today,  developers are building robots that learn about and interact with their
environment – an environment that includes other robots as well as humans. Machine
learning enables AI systems to pursue goals in ways that humans could not
anticipate,  even if  their  goals were initially formulated by humans.  We now regularly
interact with various kinds of AI,  or are subject to decisions made by these systems.
Finally,  the distinctiveness or exceptionality of the human subject has been
AI & Agency
by: Sarah Newman, Abeba Birhane, Mike Zajko, Osonde A. Osoba, Carina Prunkl, Gabriel Lima, Jon Bowen, Rich
Sutton and Cathy Adams
| 16
repeatedly problematized by advances in AI and in our understanding of other
organisms.  In this context,  conceiving of agency as the ability to change the world
remains valuable for considering issues common to humanity and AI.
Conceptualized as a means of social  change,  we can see that agency is  not a human
birthright,  and is not equally distributed across humanity.  Structured inequality
provides opportunities to some, which are denied to others. Where a person is born,
and how they are nurtured or socialized, has great consequences for the choices and
capacities available to them – including the impact a person can have on reshaping
pre-existing structures.  Agency depends on our relationship to these structures,  as
well as to each other. Hence, agency varies across positions in society and is subject
to change.  We can engineer technologies and social  systems to enhance human
agency,  to provide capabilities for transformation of individual  or collective
conditions;  or we can design to preserve and reinforce existing power structures.
Similarly,  it  is  valuable to conceptualize the agency of AI through its ability to affect
the world,  change itself,  and change human lives,  irrespective of consciousness or
intentionality. If we conceive of agency in this way, we can see the stakes of some of
the current debates about AI: to what extent will  these systems be agents of change
in our world,  and how will  AI affect human agency? What decisions will  AI make on
behalf  of humans,  and how will  these sociotechnical  systems reconfigure the
possibilities available to us?
5. Can (and Should) AI Be Considered an Agent
Gabriel  Lima
Computer science undergraduate student,  KAIST, South Korea
Provocation
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In this short essay,  I  share my thoughts on the relationship between artificial
intelligence (AI)  and various definitions of agency.  Can AI be considered an agent?
More specifically,  does AI fulfill  requirements set forth in various definitions of
agency? Depending on the perspective and definition taken by the reader,  the
agency of AI could be controversial,  unimaginable,  or an unquestionable truth.  A
question that is often neglected, however, is whether AI should be given any agency.
Even though we often derive normative statements of value (e.g.,  should,  ought to)
from descriptive statements of fact (e.g.,  can,  is),  their  distinction is  extremely
important and has been discussed by many philosophers who argue this relation is
not necessarily valid and advisable.  Finally,  I  conclude my essay by raising the open
question whether AI should indeed be an agent in our society independent of the
fulfilment of agency requirements set by various definitions.  Instead of focusing on
the abilities of an AI,  what if  we first ask whether it  would be beneficial  to treat an
AI as an agent in society?
Introduction
Agency has never been clearly defined across,  or even within,  disciplines.  Even
though it is often related to autonomy, responsibility, or causality, no clear definition
agrees on every detail  around the complicated issue of who (or what) is  an agent.
In this short essay,  I  share my thoughts on the relationship between artificial
intelligence (AI) and agency. Can AI be considered an agent? More specifically, does
AI fulfill  requirements set in various definitions of agency? Depending on the
perspective taken by the reader,  the agency of AI could be controversial,
unimaginable,  or an unquestionable truth.  A question that is  often neglected,
however,  is  whether AI should be given agency.  Even though we often derive
normative statements of value (e.g., should, ought to) from descriptive statements of
fact (e.g.,  can,  is),  their  distinction is  important and many philosophers have argued
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that this connection is  not valid or advisable.  Finally,  I  conclude my essay by raising
the open question whether AI should indeed be an agent in our society independent
of the fulfilment of agency requirements set by various definitions.
As introduced above, agency is  not clearly defined and thus,  tackling whether AI
could qualify as an agent following every single proposed idea of agency is
infeasible.  In the following short subsections,  I  will  deal  with some common
sociological,  legal,  philosophical,  and technological  definitions of agency and share
my thoughts on whether AI could be considered an agent under each definition.
An Agent Is a Goal-Oriented Entity
Does an AI have a goal? From a computer science perspective,  this is  often how we
create and train AIs.  For instance,  in reinforcement learning we teach AIs by
rewarding them depending on whether or not they have achieved a set goal.  The
goals of an AI are not intrinsic, but extrinsic; the programmer sets its goals following
his or her needs.  This does not,  however,  disqualify AI as a candidate for agency.
According to the idea that agency is  based on a goal-oriented behavior,  AI could be
seen as an agent.
An Agent Can Act and Modify Its Behavior Depending on the Environment
This definition is  often used in computer science when dealing with reinforcement
learning,  a method used to train AIs.  In this setting,  we define AI as an agent in an
environment with a set of policies and actions.  Given that AI is  defined as an agent
from its conception,  it  is  easy to imagine an AI as an agent after its deployment.
An Agent Has an Effect on the World and Drives Social  Change
Following this more sociological  perspective,  an agent must make a difference in
society to qualify for agency.  In the current “AI Summer,”  AI is  affecting society in
ways many did not expect – or did expect,  but unfortunately neglected. AI has been
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disruptive in diverse sections of society.  Job markets having to adapt to the
insertion of these electronic entities,  and recommendation algorithms controlling
what kind of information a certain part of society has access to,  are among many
examples of novel consequences AI is imposing on society. It is not hard to see an AI
as an agent considering its impact on society.
An Agent Can Engage With or Resist Colonial  Power
Even though sci-fi  scenarios give us the idea that AI can resist the power of its
creators,  this possibility is  far from us.  AI cannot resist and turn against its own
creator,  due to both lack of ability and the high level of control  creators still  have
over their creations.  AIs are distant from engaging with (or inverting) the power
pyramid,  where they are at the very bottom. More importantly,  how can they even
set that as a goal,  if  an AI is  not currently able to have intrinsic goals? By this
conception, AI cannot be an agent since it does not engage in any action dealing with
its creators and its hierarchical  position.
An Agent Is an Entity That Acts on Behalf  of a Principal
We often build AIs as entities to complete a certain task for humans.  These systems
act on behalf  of a principal,  which can be their programmers,  manufacturers,  or
users.  The principal  sets the AI’s goals and the system works towards achieving
them. By this conception of agency,  an AI is  clearly an agent.  Some authors even
argue that AI could be a “perfect agent,”  since it  does not have intentions or goals
that could deviate from its principal’s  goals.
As issued raised by many legal  scholars about AI agency is  the usual  requirement of
a contract to establish a principal-agent relationship.  Since AI has not (yet)  been
granted any kind of legal  personhood, it  cannot be a party to a legal  contract.
Consequently,  while an AI could be seen as an agent under a principal  in economic
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terms,  it  cannot qualify as one legally.
An Agent Can Bear Responsibility for Its Actions
Can an AI be responsible for its actions? How would this responsibility even be
assigned to an entity that cannot be held accountable for its actions? If an AI causes
damage, how can it be punished? These issues are raised by many law scholars when
dealing with the liability assignment of an act with legal  consequences by an AI.  At
present,  liability usually goes towards the manufacturer or user of an AI,  so the AI
system itself  cannot be seen as an agent.
But Should AI Be Considered an Agent?
As I  have argued above, depending on how you define agency,  the idea of AI being
an agent can be seen as either reasonable or completely absurd.  Given that it  is  a
possibility, should we consider AI as an agent? Even though we often derive whether
an entity should receive any consideration from its ontology and capabilities,  should
we apply the same reasoning when dealing with AI? Would that be beneficial  to our
society,  our legal  systems, or even humanity as a whole? Should we even ask that
question?
With the fast development of AI,  we keep dwelling on what each system can and
cannot do; we thereby neglect the question of whether this consideration is the right
one to focus on.  What if,  instead of focusing on what an AI can do,  we center
discussion on whether these entities can be seen as agents no matter how complex,
intelligent,  or autonomous they might be? Although the abilities and inabilities of
current AI systems are important to the discussion of the position of AI in society,
this might better be left as a follow-up question to the most immediate inquiry: given
the lack of agreement on the definition of agency and regardless of the abilities of
these newly developed entities, is it socially beneficial or possible to consider AIs as
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agents?
6. How does AI affect human Autonomy?
Carina Prunkl
Senior Research Scholar,  Future of Humanity Institute,  University of Oxford
Autonomy (autos = self;  nomos = law) in the context of human beings refers to the
capacity of self-governance or self-determination.  This also implies that an
individual’s  actions are neither the product of external  manipulation,  nor imposition
of external  forces.  Autonomy in this sense plays an important role in Western
culture and is often considered desirable for the individual.  When we speak about
‘autonomous systems’ in the context of artificial  intelligence,  we similarly refer to
some sort of ‘self-governance’,  but in contrast to human case,  this ‘autonomy’ has
little to do with acting true to one’s own beliefs,  desires or motivations.  Instead, it
refers to the capacity of the system to learn and perform certain tasks without
human guidance or supervision. A well-known example of such ‘autonomous systems’
are self-driving cars that navigate themselves through traffic to bring their
passengers from A to B.  But of course this type of ‘autonomy’ is  not limited to the
mechanical  realm and we may easily conceive of virtual  ‘autonomous systems’,  such
as virtual  assistants that organize our lives by making appointments,  doing (online)
grocery shopping,  taking notes,  etc.  By outsourcing seemingly trivial  tasks such as
driving and grocery shopping – not to mention some highly non-trivial  tasks,  such as
those now performed by soldiers but that might at some point become automated –
we are handing over more and more responsibilities to ‘autonomous systems.’  How
will  such a development affect our own autonomy? It  is  difficult  to imagine that at
least those of us who are somewhat indifferent to the joy of driving,  will  feel  or be
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less autonomous by having a car that takes us to where we want to go faster and
safer.  This is  at least in part because it  is  we, after all,  who decide where to go and
when. But what about when such ‘autonomous systems’ not only navigate us through
traffic,  but also through life? When they learn from our behavioral  patterns,  our
preferences,  our relationships,  to make predictions about,  say,  what groceries we
would like to eat next week? Here the situation is  much less clear.  Do we gain
autonomy by not having to be bothered with boring grocery planning and shopping,
and instead having time for the things we would really like to do? Or do we instead
forfeit  autonomy by not being the ones who make the choices about our nutrition,
returning almost to the childlike state of not having to take responsibility for certain
aspects of our lives? These are questions we urgently need to ask ourselves.
7. The Myth of Agency
Sarah Newman
Senior Researcher,  Principal  at metaLAB at Harvard
Fellow, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society,  Harvard University
“Ultimately,  nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under
his control.”
– Thomas Nagel,  Moral  Luck
We look,  critically,  at how our technologies work,  and yet we make assumptions
about how we work.  What motivates our choices? Are we in control  of our actions –
and if  so,  all  of them, or only some of them? As our interactions with and
dependence on new technologies,  including AI,  become both increasingly common
and invisible,  what,  if  any,  agency are we giving up? If  we better understand our
agency,  how does this connect to our responsibility for the technological  world we
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are creating,  and the natural  world we are destroying? What responsibilities should
we have for our own behaviors,  and where does accountability reside in automated
systems?
We use the term “agency” to refer to humans,  to current and future AI systems, as
part of a framework for responsibility and accountability.  But what do we mean by
agency? Agency is  defined differently across disciplines–from computer science to
philosophy to sociology to law. Recent developments in neuroscience and AI both
call  into question the accepted notion of volitional  agency as the willed proximate
cause of a thought or an action.  How might exploring frameworks of agency affect
our approaches to ethical standards in the development of AI? A potential blind spot
in our analysis of the development of AI lies in the assumptions we make about our
own agency,  freedom of will,  and moral  capabilities.
Are we are actually more accurate when describing the behavior of
machines–mechanistic,  physical,  governed by the laws of nature and
programming–than we are when we describe ourselves? Things get fuzzy as the
mysteries of consciousness and subjectivity arise.  What is  true – and what,  if  not
true,  is  useful  to believe?
We believe that we, as humans, have at least some agency. We acknowledge that our
degrees of agency differ across individuals and circumstances,  increasing or
decreasing based on certain constraints,  and governed by physical  laws–at least
those outside of our brains.  Most people don’t  believe that they could defy physical
laws:  the laws of gravity,  survival  without food, etc.  We accept these physical
constraints, those that appear to affect all beings and appear to be external to us, or
at least external  to our physical  bodies.  Yes,  this agency is  highly variable:  a healthy
adult has more agency,  people tend to agree,  than a baby,  or someone who is very
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old or unwell.
We tend to agree that we do not have the agency to fly,  or to travel in time, or
countless other fantastical things (barring of course certain mental illnesses, or other
illnesses which impinge on mental  capacities,  which have their own unique
relationship to agency and thus also to responsibility). And yet most people now, and
throughout history–across cultures, ages, and every other demographic factor–have a
distinct sense of being in control  of (at least some of)  our behaviors and actions.
Even though it  is  difficult to explain,  there is a distinct and overwhelming sense that
I  am choosing to write these words,  that I  will  choose what to have for dinner,  that I
could choose to clap my hands,  or nod my head, or close my eyes.  This sense,  as
inexplicable,  biologically and physically,  as it  may be (as a being comprised of
physical  matter that came into existence in a way that I  certainly did not will),  from
where did it arise? Is the sense of agency I possess merely a myth? Perhaps a useful,
or even inescapable myth? If  so,  is  considering such questions useful or productive?
For me, reflecting on such questions is  enriching:  it  enriches my daily life and my
experiences. Paying attention to this deep and abiding mystery, somewhat ironically,
feels empowering – as if  I  am curiously contemplating whether the backdrop is a
facade, whether this sense of agency is  indeed an illusion.  I  acknowledge the
possible privilege of this perspective.  Perhaps,  if  I  do indeed have some sort of
inexplicable agency, contemplating it is enjoyable because I have (if I have it at all) a
relatively high degree of it.  But perhaps not.
Such topics have fascinated philosophers,  theologists,  and most humans for so long
as we have records of such contemplation.  Debates on free will  or the existence of
agency–nevertheless have barely made their way into discussions of the new
sophisticated technologies we are creating–particularly AI, in terms of how it already
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is acting in the world,  as well  as how it  could impact the future.  We talk about
autonomy and responsibility, but can we use this moment to also reflect back on our
assumptions about ourselves?
A potentially defensible extension might argue that moral responsibility can only be1.
rooted in agents that have some ability to modify their target goals.
The Book of Job is a clear example of this dynamic. The work establishes repeatedly2.
that Job was blameless.  Yet,  three of Job’s four friends insist  that Job’s misfortune
is just punishment for his sins,  as God is necessarily just.
Max Weber (1919) “Politics as Vocation”3.
There is  an implicit  assumption here:  that all  reality/any observable phenomenon is4.
rational  and discoverable.
Birhane, A.  (2017).  Descartes Was Wrong: ‘A Person Is a Person through Other5.
Persons’.  Aeon.
Weiser,  M. (1995,  June).  The computer for the 21st century.  In Human-computer6.
interaction (pp.  933-940).  Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.
Zuboff,  S. (2019).  The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at7.
the new frontier of power.  Profile Books.
O’Neil,  C.  (2016).  Weapons of math destruction:  How big data increases inequality8.
and threatens democracy.  Broadway Books.
Bowles,  N (2018)9.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/style/digital-divide-screens-schools.html
Bowles,  N (2018)10.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/style/silicon-valley-nannies.html
Margaret S.  Archer,  “Morphogenesis versus Structuration:  On Combining Structure11.
and Action,”  The British Journal  of Sociology 61,  no.  s1  (2010):  225–52,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01245.x.
AI & Agency
by: Sarah Newman, Abeba Birhane, Mike Zajko, Osonde A. Osoba, Carina Prunkl, Gabriel Lima, Jon Bowen, Rich
Sutton and Cathy Adams
| 26
Douglas V.  Porpora,  Reconstructing Sociology:  The Critical  Realist  Approach12.
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  2016).
Bruno Latour,  “On Actor-Network Theory:  A Few Clarifications,”  Soziale Welt 47,13.
no.  4 (January 1,  1996):  369–81,  https://doi.org/10.2307/40878163.
Edwin Sayes,  “Actor–Network Theory and Methodology:  Just What Does It  Mean to14.
Say That Nonhumans Have Agency?,”  Social  Studies of Science 44,  no.  1  (2014):
134–49.
Bruno Latour,  “Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane15.
Artifacts,”  in Shaping Technology/Building Society:  Studies in Sociotechnical
Change, ed.  Wiebe E.  Bijker and John Law (Cambridge,  MA: MIT Press,  1992),
225–58.
Michel Callon,  “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation:  Domestication of the16.
Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay,”  The Sociological  Review 32 (1984):
196–233,  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1984.tb00113.x.
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar,  eds.,  Relational  Autonomy: Feminist17.
Perspectives on Automony, Agency,  and the Social  Self  (Oxford:  Oxford University
Press,  2000),
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ubc/detail.action?docID=430598.
Jason Edward Lewis et al.,  “Making Kin with the Machines,”  Journal  of Design and18.
Science,  July 16,  2018,  https://doi.org/10.21428/bfafd97b.
Jerry Lee Rosiek,  Jimmy Snyder,  and Scott L.  Pratt,  “The New Materialisms and19.
Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency:  Making the Case for Respectful  Anti-
Colonial  Engagement,”  Qualitative Inquiry,  February 27,  2019,  1077800419830135,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800419830135.
In Barad’s “agential  realism”,  drawing on Latour and quantum theory,  “agency is  not20.
an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world.  The universe is  agential
intra-activity in its becoming”. Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum
AI & Agency
by: Sarah Newman, Abeba Birhane, Mike Zajko, Osonde A. Osoba, Carina Prunkl, Gabriel Lima, Jon Bowen, Rich
Sutton and Cathy Adams
| 27
Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University
Press,  2007),  141
